We consider the decoding problem or the problem of finding low weight codewords for rank metric codes. We show how additional information about the codeword we want to find under the form of certain linear combinations of the entries of the codeword leads to algorithms with a better complexity. This is then used together with a folding technique for attacking a McEliece scheme based on LRPC codes. It leads to a feasible attack on one of the parameters suggested in [11] .
I. INTRODUCTION
McEliece schemes. The hardness of the problem of decoding a linear code makes its use very attractive in the cryptographic setting. Indeed it has been proven to be NP-complete for the Hamming metric in the seminal paper of Berlekamp, McEliece and van Tilborg [2] . Moreover, despite some significant research efforts, only exponential algorithms are known for it and the exponent has decreased only very slowly over time [1] . One of the very first public-key cryptosystem [19] is actually (partly) based on this problem. It still belongs to the very few public key cryptosystems which remain unbroken today.
One of the drawbacks of this scheme is its large public key size. It relies on a particular code family, namely Goppa codes, which in many respects look like random linear codes but still have an efficient decoding algorithm. Since then, many approaches have been tried to reduce the key size: (i) alternative code families have been proposed, (ii) using codes with a large automorphism group such as quasi-cyclic codes, (iii) changing the metric used for the code and the code itself.
McEliece schemes based on rank metric codes. In this paper we focus on a proposal which is a mixture of the approaches (ii) and (iii): the LRPC scheme of [11] . It relies on a new family of codes, called Low Rank Parity Check (LRPC in short) codes which are devised for the rank metric. The first McEliece scheme based on rank metric codes was the Gabidulin-Paramonov-Tretjakov cryptosystem [9] . It relies on an analogue of Reed-Solomon codes for the rank metric, the "Gabidulin codes". The scheme got broken by Overbeck in [22] . One of the main reasons for its insecurity can be traced back to its rich algebraic structure. This is not the case for the LRPC scheme. For this family of codes, like for the MDPC codes based McEliece scheme of [20] , it seems that key security and message security really rely on the same problem, namely finding a low rank weight (or moderate Hamming weight for [20] ) codeword in a linear code with no structure.
Decoding for the rank metric. It is essential with this approach to have a good assessment of the complexity of solving the decoding problem in the rank metric. Recall that in Delsarte's language [5] , linear rank metric codes are viewed as the subspace generated by a set of matrices of a same size over some finite field F q . The associated decoding problem is also known under the name "MinRank" and is known to be NPcomplete [3] . Generally such codes arise in the form of linear codes defined over some extension field F q m . This problem has attracted some attention in the cryptographic community and algorithms of exponential complexity have been devised for it [4] , [21] , [12] , [15] , [6] .
Attacks on quasi-cyclic codes by folding the code. The parameters of the LRPC scheme have been devised in order to be safe against the aforementioned algorithms for decoding in the rank metric. However, the authors of the scheme have also used quasi-cyclic versions of such codes in order to reduce further the size of the parameters. It has been found out recently [7] , [8] that McEliece versions based on quasi-cylic or quasi-monoidic codes can be attacked by reducing the size of the code by adding coordinates which belong to the same orbit of the automorphism group. This is called the "folding" process in these papers. When this process is applied to quasicyclic or quasi-dyadic alternant or Goppa codes suggested in the cryptographic community, this results in a much smaller alternant or Goppa code and this can be used to mount a key recovery attack. This approach was further investigated and the folding process was generalized by using a polynomial formalism in [18] . It was shown there that this approach can be used for the quasi-cyclic LRPC codes of [11] and gives a LRPC code of much smaller size but which still has in its dual low weight codewords. The decoding algorithm of [12] can then be used to find these low weight codewords in a more efficient way than for the original code. This results in a multiplicative gain in the complexity of the attack of order 2 12 for one of the parameters proposed in [11] .
Our contribution. Our contribution in the paper is threefold. First we show how certain rank decoding algorithms of [21] , [12] may benefit from some partial knowledge on the codeword which is sought. We consider here that we are given certain linear combinations of the entries of the codeword. This generalizes the F q m linear case where a certain entry can be assumed to be equal to 1. Roughly speaking, when we search in the latter case for a rank weight w codeword using the algorithm of [21] , [12] we have algorithms of complexity q (w−1)α where α is some quantity that depends on the algorithm which is considered and some code parameters. We show how the complexity of these algorithms can be reduced to q (w−a)α when we know a independent linear combinations of the code positions. We also obtain by the approach of [12] applied to the transposed code an algorithm with the same complexity as [21] but which is significantly simpler. Finally, we show that when the folding process is applied to the quasi-cyclic F q m linear codes considered in [11] we know two independent linear combinations of the codeword we are looking for, instead of just one. This is then used together with the generalized folding process of [18] to give a much more efficient attack than in [18] .
II. GENERALITIES ABOUT RANK METRIC CODES
Let us start with the definition of a matrix code Definition II.1 (Matrix code). A matrix code of size m × n over F q is a linear code generated by matrices of size m × n over F q . When the code is of dimension K we say that it is an [m × n, K] matrix code over F q .
Remark II.2. It will be convenient to express K under the form K = k.m. Notice that k is not necessarily an integer.
It might be thought that this is nothing but a linear code of length m.n. The point of this definition is that we equip such codes with the rank metric that is defined by d(A, B) = Rank(A−B). The weight |c| of a word c is taken with respect to the rank, that is |c| 
This definition depends of course of the basis chosen for F q m . However changing the basis does not change the distance between codewords. The point of defining matrix codes in this way is that they have a more compact description. It is readily seen that an [m × n, k.m] matrix code can be specified from a systematic generator matrix by k(n − k)m 2 log 2 q bits whereas a F q m -linear code uses only k(n − k) log 2 q m = k(n − k)m log 2 q bits. This is particularly interesting for cryptographic applications where this notion is directly related to the public key size. We can now define the two central problem in this field, namely Problem II.1 (Decoding in the rank metric). For a given matrix code C of type [m × n, K] over F q , a matrix A in F m×n q and an integer w, find a codeword c in C such that
Problem II.2 (Low rank codeword problem). For a given matrix code C and an integer w, find a codeword c of rank weight w in C.
The decoding problem reduces to the low rank codeword problem by finding a codeword of weight w in the matrix code C where C is generated by the codewords of C and A when C does not contain codewords of rank weight w. In other words, decoding an error of weight w in an [m × n, K] matrix code reduces to the problem of finding a codeword of weight w in an [m × n, K + 1] matrix code. Notice that the low rank codeword problem is slightly simpler for matrix codes obtained from F q m linear codes. Indeed, we may assume that the codeword c of weight w contains a coordinate equal to 1. This follows from the fact that multiplying c by any nonzero element of F q m does not change the rank of the associated matrix. In other words, we have some additional knowledge about the codeword (or the error) of weight w in this case. Notice that the support trapping decoding algorithm (see next section) of [12] and the decoding algorithm of [21] given for F q m both exploit this knowledge. They have an asymptotic exponential complexity of the form q α(w−1) whereas it would have been only q αw for an unstructured matrix code with the same parameters. [12] has introduced a very neat and simple algorithm for decoding in the rank metric. It can be considered as a support trapping decoding algorithm for an [m × n, k.m] matrix code that tries to guess a subspace F of the column space F m q of m × n matrices over F q that contains the column space E of the error e we want to find. Since we focus on the low-weight finding problem in this article we will explain this algorithm in the case we look for a codeword of weight w in an [m×n, K] code. In this case, E is the column space of c. The next step is then to express the columns c i of c in a basis f 1 , . . . , f r of F , that is c i = r j=1 x ij f j . This gives n.r unknowns (the x ij 's). From a parity-check matrix of the matrix code we deduce n.m−k.m = (n−k)m equations involving the entries of c that can all be expressed in terms of the x ij 's. In other words, we have a linear system with (n − k)m equations and n.r unknowns. We choose r to be the least integer such that the number of unknowns is less than the number of equations. In our case, r = m − km n . The complexity of the algorithm depends on the probability of having E ⊂ F . It is equal to the number of subspaces of dimension w in a subspace of dimension r, divided by the number of all subspaces of dimension w in F m q . This probability can be easily expressed with Gaussian coefficients, which counts the number of subspaces of a vector-space :
III. A SUPPORT TRAPPING DECODING ALGORITHM
We use here the following notation.
Notation III.1. m r q is the Gaussian binomial coefficient that is equal to the number of subspaces of F m q of dimension r. Recall that this coefficient satisfies m r q = Θ q r(m−r) .
The cost to solve a linear system of (n − k)m unknown by Gaussian elimination is O (n − k) 3 m 3 . Thus, the overall expected complexity for this algorithm is O (n − k) 3 m 3 q w km n . As explained in [12] F can be viewed as the support of a codeword for the rank metric. What makes this notion interesting is that it establishes a parallel with the Hamming metric : indeed, if we know the support c of a codeword c we can recover c in polynomial time by solving a linear system.
This algorithm is much more efficient than the algorithm in [21] when m ≤ n. Let us notice that in the case m > n we can improve this algorithm in a simple way by using the notion of the transposed code which is defined as follows [10] Definition III.2 (transposed code). The transposed of an [m×
The idea underlying the definition of such a code is that transposing a matrix preserves its rank, therefore finding the minimum rank weight (nonzero) codeword C can be obtained from the transpose of the minimum rank weight (nonzero) codeword of C T . Notice that taking the transpose basically swaps the role of n and m. This notion can be used when m ≥ n for finding a codeword of weight w in a matrix code C by looking for a codeword of weight w in C T . It is readily seen that this leads to an algorithm of complexity O (n − k) 3 m 3 q w k for finding a codeword of weight w. This is precisely the complexity that the algorithm of [21] would give for finding a codeword of weight w in a matrix code. However the algorithm presented here is much simpler than the algorithm of [21] .
IV. A LOW WEIGHT CODEWORD FINDING ALGORITHM USING ADDITIONAL KNOWLEDGE ON THE CODEWORD
In this section, we assume that we have additional knowledge about the codeword of weight w we want to find in the form of linear combinations of its columns. More precisely we are looking for an algorithm whose input and output are specified in Algorithm 1. The case of a matrix code obtained from an F q m -linear code is a particular case of such an additional knowledge: as explained before we can assume that one of the columns of the codeword we are looking for is the column (10 . . . 0)
T . The folding attack that we present in Section V will provide another example where we have the knowledge of two independent linear combinations of the columns and will use in an essential way the algorithm we give here.
A. The case n > m
We use here a variation of the support trapping algorithm [12] . The case when a = 1 and when the matrix code is 
B. The case m ≥ n
This will be treated essentially by a variation on the error trapping algorithm applied to the transposed code which uses in a suitable way the additional knowledge about the codeword we want to find. This algorithm is given in [14] , subsection 4. 
V. FOLDING AND PROJECTING ATTACK
In this section we present a key recovery attack on the LRPC cryptosystem [11] . The codes used there are defined by Definition V.1 (LRPC code). Let C be the matrix code associated to the F q m -linear code with a full rank parity check matrix H of size (n − k) × n. It defines an [n, k] LRPC of weight d if the F q subspace of F q m generated by the entries of H is of dimension d.
A probabilistic decoding algorithm of polynomial time for LRPC codes is presented in [11] . This algorithm uses in an essential way that such a code has a parity-check matrix H that has entries in a subspace of small dimension. H can be easily hidden by giving a systematic parity-check matrix H syst . This family of codes can then be used in a McEliece type scheme [19] : the secret key is H and the public key is H syst . To recover the secret key, the attacker must find a word of weight d in the dual of C, which is hard in principle. To decrease the key sizes, double-circulant LRPC codes are suggested in [11] . 
A. Folded and projected codes
We present here two new ingredients of the attacks that follow, namely the notion of folded code and the notion of projected code. The first attack uses only folding but the second attack uses both. The notion of projected codes uses the polynomial framework for dealing with quasi-cyclic codes [17] , [16] . Quasi-cyclic codes are a generalization of doublecirculant codes : they are defined by a parity check matrix formed only from circulant blocks. Such a quasi-cyclic code of length N = n defined over a finite field K, where the size of the circulant blocks is n, can also be viewed as code over the ring K[X]/(X n − 1). This is a specific instance of cellular codes that are codes defined over a ring R = K[X]/(f (X)) where f (X) is a polynomial of K[X]. A cellular code of length over R defines a code C of length deg f over K. is called the index of the cellular code C. In order to simplify notation, we avoid here to introduce explicitly the operation that passes from the ring code to C and view sometimes a cellular code as a code of length deg f over K and sometimes as a ring code of length over R. This formalism is recalled in [14, Subsection 5.1] , and is used in the following definition introduced in [18] for the first time. . . . , c ) and applying the surjective morphism Π from K[X]/(f (X)) to K[X]/(g(X)) defined by Π(a(X)) = a(X) (mod g(X)) to every entry c i .
In the particular case where f (X) = X n − 1 and g(X) = X m − 1 where m is a divisor of n, projecting corresponds to folding in the sense of [7] , [8] . This really amounts to sum the coordinates that belong to the same orbit of a (permutation) autorphism of order n/m that leaves the quasi-cyclic code invariant.
There are two points which make these two notions very interesting in the cryptographic setting. The first point is that these two reductions of the code do not lead to a trivial code at the end (one could have feared to end up with the full space after projecting or folding). This comes from the following proposition that is proved in [18, Corollary 1] Proposition V.5. Consider a cellular code C of index defined over R def = K[X]/(f (X)) and let g(X) be a divisor of f (X) in K[X]. The length of the projected code C g is deg g whereas the dimension of C g is less than or equal to s where s is the rank of the cellular code.
The second point is that this operation of folding behaves nicely with respect to projecting a quasi-cyclic code defined over an extension field F q m with respect to the rank distance over F q when the divisor g belongs to F q [X]
Proposition V. 6 ([18, Prop.3] ). Consider a cellular code C of index defined over R def = F q m [X]/(f (X)) and let g(X) be a divisor of f (X) in F q (X). Denote by Π the associated projection operation. We have Rank(Π(c)) ≤ Rank(c) for any c ∈ C where we view these codewords as matrices in F m× deg f q or in F m× deg g q by taking the matrix form of these codewords as defined in Section II.
Notice that this proposition can always be applied to folded codes. These two propositions allow to search for a codeword c of rank w in a quasi-cyclic code C of index and length n defined over F q m by projecting it with respect to a divisor of X n − 1 that belongs to F q [X] (or by folding it) and looking for a word of rank ≤ w in the projected or folded code. Roughly speaking, the first proposition ensures that we are not looking for a word w in the entire space. From the second proposition, we expect that as long w is below the Gilbert-Varshamov bound of the folded code, the codeword of weight ≤ w we will find in the projected code corresponds to the projection of c. This allows to recover easily c.
B. A first attack based on folding
Let C be a DC-LRPC [2k, k] code of weight d over F q m obtained from a parity-check matrix H. To recover H it is clearly sufficient to find a codeword of rank weight d in the dual C ⊥ of C. Let C be the folding of order 1 of C ⊥ . It is in general a [2, 1] code. This folding reveals some additional information about the subspace F of F q m generated by the coefficients of H. We namely have Proposition V.7. Let c = (c 1 , c 2 ) be in C . There exists c of weight d in C ⊥ such that the F q -subspace generated by the coordinates of c contains c 1 and c 2 .
We can use (c 1 , c 2 ) in the decoding algorithm described in Section IV. From c we recover immediately a parity-check matrix of the form βH, where β ∈ F q m \{0}, by building a parity-check matrix from c and its cyclic shifts. This gives an attack of complexity O k 3 m 3 q (d−2) m 2 . However for the parameters proposed in [11] , [13] , this does not improve the attacks already considered there. However, this proposition together with another projection of the code will lead to a feasible attack against a certain parameter of [11] , [13] as we now show.
C. An improved attack based on folding and projecting
To improve the attack, we search for a word of weight d in a projected code. This new attack depends on the factorization of X k − 1. The length of the projected code we are interested in will be smaller than m and we will use the algorithm of Subsection IV-B instead. The attack can be described as
Step 1: Compute C the folding of order 1 of C ⊥ and extract a codeword (c 1 , c 2 ) in it.
Step 2: Compute the projected code C ⊥ D with respect to a certain divisor D(X) of X k − 1 in F q [X].
Step 3: Find a codeword c" in C ⊥ D of weight w such that the F q space generated by its coordinates contains c 1 and c 2 by using the algorithm of Subsection IV-B.
Step 4: Let F be the F q -subspace of F q m generated by the coordinates of c". Find the codeword c in C ⊥ of rank weight w whose support is F (meaning that the F q -subspace generated by its coordinates should belong to F .)
What justifies the third step is the fact that Proposition V.7 generalizes easily to the projected code, whereas what justifies
Step 4 is the fact that it is extremely likely that c" is the projection of a codeword in C ⊥ of weight d we are looking for, for the weight of c" is lesser than the Gilbert-Varshamov bound of the projected code. We recover in this case such a codeword by the process of Step 4. The complexity of this attack is dominated by the third step and is given by [14, Th4.6] .
In [11] , some parameters for the LRPC cryptosystem are suggested. They are recalled in the following table n k m q d security 74 37 41 2 4 80 94 47 47 2 5 128 68 34 23 2 4 4 100
In each case the factorization of X k − 1 in F q [X] is given by (i) X 37 − 1 = (X − 1) 36 i=0 X i (ii) X 47 − 1 = (X − 1)P Q with deg P = deg Q = 23 (iii) X 34 − 1 = (X − 1) 2 (P 1 . . . P 8 ) 2 with deg P i = 2, for all i ∈ 1; 8 .
In the first case, the polynomial X 37 − 1 has only two divisors, so we can only use the first attack. In the second case, we can choose D = P or Q to obtain a folded code of dimension 23. According to [14, Th4.6] , the complexity of the attack is O 23 3 47 3 2 3×22) ≈ 2 96.2 , that is a gain around 2 32 compared to the best attack considered in [11] and about 2 20 compared to the best attack found in [18, Subsec. 3.2] .
The third case is the most interesting. Here we can freely choose the dimension of the projected code. Keep in mind that we want the Gilbert-Varshamov bound greater than d which is the case when the dimension k" of the projected code is 4. We choose k" = 4 and we have in this case an attack of complexity 2 43.6 which clearly leads to a feasible attack.
